| No. | Title | Author |
| 1. | General Introduction | Hamilton |
| 2. | Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence | Jay |
| 3. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence |
Jay |
| 4. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence |
Jay |
| 5. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence |
Jay |
| 6. | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States | Hamilton |
| 7. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States |
Hamilton |
| 8. | The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States | Hamilton |
| 9. | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection | Hamilton |
| 10. | The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection |
Madison |
| 11. | The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy | Hamilton |
| 12. | The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue | Hamilton |
| 13. | Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government | Hamilton |
| 14. | Objections to the Proposed Constitution from Extent of Territory Answered | Madison |
| 15. | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union | Hamilton |
| 16. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton |
| 17. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton |
| 18. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton and Madison |
| 19. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton and Madison |
| 20. | The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
Hamilton and Madison |
| 21. | Other Defects of the Present Confederation | Hamilton |
| 22. | The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation |
Hamilton |
| 23. | The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union | Hamilton |
| 24. | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered | Hamilton |
| 25. | The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered |
Hamilton |
| 26. | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered | Hamilton |
| 27. | The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered |
Hamilton |
| 28. | The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered |
Hamilton |
| 29. | Concerning the Militia | Hamilton |
| 30. | Concerning the General Power of Taxation | Hamilton |
| 31. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton |
| 32. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton |
| 33. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton |
| 34. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton |
| 35. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton |
| 36. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation |
Hamilton |
| 37. | Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government | Madison |
| 38. | The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed | Madison |
| 39. | The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles | Madison |
| 40. | The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained | Madison |
| 41. | General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution | Madison |
| 42. | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered | Madison |
| 43. | The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered |
Madison |
| 44. | Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States | Madison |
| 45. | The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered | Madison |
| 46. | The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared | Madison |
| 47. | The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts | Madison |
| 48. | These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other | Madison |
| 49. | Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention | Hamilton or Madison |
| 50. | Periodic Appeals to the People Considered | Hamilton or Madison |
| 51. | The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments | Hamilton or Madison |
| 52. | The House of Representatives | Hamilton or Madison |
| 53. | The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives |
Hamilton or Madison |
| 54. | The Apportionment of Members Among the States | Hamilton or Madison |
| 55. | The Total Number of the House of Representatives | Hamilton or Madison |
| 56. | The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of Representatives |
Hamilton or Madison |
| 57. | The Alleged Tendency of the Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation | Hamilton or Madison |
| 58. | Objection that the Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered | Madison |
| 59. | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members | Hamilton |
| 60. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members |
Hamilton |
| 61. | The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members |
Hamilton |
| 62. | The Senate | Hamilton or Madison |
| 63. | The Senate Continued | Hamilton or Madison |
| 64. | The Powers of the Senate | Jay |
| 65. | The Powers of the Senate Continued | Hamilton |
| 66. | Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered | Hamilton |
| 67. | The Executive Department | Hamilton |
| 68. | The Mode of Electing the President | Hamilton |
| 69. | The Real Character of the Executive | Hamilton |
| 70. | The Executive Department Further Considered | Hamilton |
| 71. | The Duration in Office of the Executive | Hamilton |
| 72. | The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered | Hamilton |
| 73. | The Provision for Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power | Hamilton |
| 74. | The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive | Hamilton |
| 75. | The Treaty Making Power of the Executive | Hamilton |
| 76. | The Appointing Power of the Executive | Hamilton |
| 77. | The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered | Hamilton |
| 78. | The Judiciary Department | Hamilton |
| 79. | The Judiciary Continued | Hamilton |
| 80. | The Powers of the Judiciary | Hamilton |
| 81. | The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of Judicial Authority | Hamilton |
| 82. | The Judiciary Continued | Hamilton |
| 83. | The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury | Hamilton |
| 84. | Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered | Hamilton |
| 85. | Concluding Remarks | Hamilton |